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THE ROCKEFELLER AMENDMENT: ITS
ORIGINS, ITS EFFECT AND ITS FUTURE
DENNIS M. ABRAMS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Rockefeller Amendment, section 3 of S. 1403, proposes
to amend section 503(a)(7) of the Federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977. This Amendment, named after
West Virginia's Governor, would amend section 503(a)(7) of the
federal mining act to require that state programs contain rules
and regulations consistent only with the federal act as a condition
precedent to approval. At present, section 503(a)(7) requires state
programs to contain rules and regulations "consistent with" the
Act and with the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
Interior.
Congress did not define "consistent with" but the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) did by regulation and policy. Thus,
to obtain program approval, states must prove that their regulations are no less stringent than the federal regulations and the
federal Act. To many, this was interpreted as requiring state regulations "identical to" those of OSM as a condition precedent to
state program approval.
S. 1403 was hailed by senators and governors from the coalproducing states because it appeared to provide much-needed
flexibility. It proposed to substitute state-authored regulations in
place of the federal regulations which OSM wrote to implement
the Act. Opponents of the Rockefeller Amendment viewed it as a
means to "gut" the federal act because, if the amendment became
law, the federal regulations would not apply to mining on state
lands under an approved state program. The opponents believed
that section 503(a)(7) as enacted made the federal regulations
mandatory guidelines regardless of whether a state-approved program exists.

* A.B. Middlebury College; J.D. West Virginia University; Assistant Attorney
General of West Virginia.
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S. 1403 was passed without change by the Senate on September 11, 1979. The vote was 68 to 26, a much greater margin than
anyone predicted. The bill was then sent to the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, chaired by Rep. Morris K. Udall
(D. Ariz.). Primarily due to lobbying efforts, the bill has yet to be
considered by the committee. Faced with this delay, proponents
in the Senate have threatened to append S. 1403 to another Senate bill headed for the House, thus bypassing Udall's committee.
The political stand-off continues, but by January 3, 1981, all
states wishing to assume primacy over the issuance of surface coal
mining and reclamation within their jurisdictions must submit a
state program complete with state laws and regulations in conformity with section 503(a).
In this era of increased emphasis on coal as an energy source,
issuance of permits by OSM is favored by few. Even OSM intends
for the states to regulate coal mining activities under approved
state programs and has conveyed this intention to the states.
Many believe that state primacy over issuance of coal mining permits is essential. Those familiar with the coal industry are convinced that OSM cannot effectively run twenty-six separate coal
mining permit programs. Presently OSM is budgeted and staffed
to act in a supervisory capacity. It is doubtful that OSM could
administer federal programs in more than a few states without
massive budget and personnel increases.
The Rockefeller Amendment was believed by many to be the
most direct method of re-establishing the state lead concept Congress supposedly envisioned in the Act. Its proponents attributed
most of the problems with the federal act to the inflexible and
unworkable regulations written by OSM. In testimony during
congressional oversight hearings West Virginia officials echoed
this sentiment:
The central underlying cause of virtually all of these
problems [with state assumption of a Pub. L. No. 95-87 program] is the belief and policy made evident in discussion and
negotiations with OSM that state laws and regulations, in order to be consistent with federal regulations, must be identical
to the regulations contained in the Federal Register. If they
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THE ORIGINS OF THE ROCKEFELLER AMENDMENT

The Rockefeller Amendment did not develop overnight. It
was the product of at least one full year of states' efforts to implement the interim federal regulations and the interim provisions of
the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The
interim regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior on December 13, 1977. They were enacted as state law in
West Virginia on August 14, 1978. However, even before the
August rulemaking, West Virginia officials began to experience a
wide range of problems with the interim federal regulations.
According to state officials many of the interim regulations
had never been field tested by the federal government, whereas
similar state regulations had proven effective. Further, some interim regulations precluded use of proven design criteria and
methods of operation, many of which were developed by West
Virginia in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Still other interim
regulations were found ill-suited to the mountainous terrain and
the wet climate of the Appalachian states. When the Reclamation
Division of the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) began to implement the new regulations, more problems
surfaced. For example, DNR had to determine how an operator
was supposed to segregate and store specified quantities of topsoil
when there was actually much less topsoil available on site. The
interim regulations required monitoring of groundwater by wells
but did not take into account the number of aquifers that could
exist throughout any eastern mountain region. The practical
means of achieving certain mandatory reclamation goals on previously mined lands were lacking. The valley fill design criteria pioneered in West Virginia's hollows and field tested for seven years
were replaced by design criteria which had only been tested on
the blackboards in Washington. Specific design criteria for sedimentation ponds were required by the interim regulations but the
sediment ponds mandated were simply too large to fit in West
Virginia hollows. Moreover, DNR officials feared that a large
pond would create a potential hazard for downstream residents.
1

125 CONG. REc. S. 12,381 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
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Both OSM and the DNR have been and continue to be
served with notices of intent to sue by concerned citizens. Each
notice received to date cites specific examples alleging DNR's failure to administer and enforce adequately the interim regulations
in West Virginia. In one such notice of intent to sue, the validity
of twenty-seven mountaintop removal operation permits was
questioned. A mountaintop removal operation removes the top of
a mountain, extracts a seam or seams of coal, places the overburden in valleys or hollows below and levels the mountaintop, creating a flat surface. The past and present West Virginia administrations were hopeful that mountaintop operations would provide
building sites for public schools, shopping centers and homes.
Reacting to the notice of suit, department officials began to
apply vigorously the interim regulations to each mountaintop removal operation. During that process questions arose concerning
the requirements for assuring that the proposed post-mine land
use would be achieved. Operators were told to modify their permits or shut down. Some of those operators proposed to eliminate
scars left by previous mining. Some of the permits involved were
granted prior to the effective date of the state interim regulations
and the operators had already begun to remove earth. Required
financial commitments to assure housing developments as the
proposed post-mine land use were virtually impossible to obtain.
The DNR could not tell the operators how to comply with the
interim regulations.
As a result, most of the operators changed their proposed
method of mining and opted to return the land to its pre-mining
contour. A year after the first notice of suit was served on DNR,
only seven of the twenty-seven operators still intended to pursue
mountaintop removal techniques and leave a flat surface. Recently OSM proposed changes to the interim regulations which
will finally eliminate some of the problems uncovered by this notice of suit, but to date only two operators have submitted acceptable plans for mountaintop removal operations. Although Congress intended that mountaintop removal operations should be
the exception to the rule, many believed that such operations
would seldom qualify as exceptions because of OSM's hostility to
such mining techniques.
To compound problems, most of the bonding companies
which do business in West Virginia's coal fields suspended issu-
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ance of reclamation bonds for coal mining operations. The suspension was prompted by the prevailing uncertainty as to how
the regulations would be applied. In the face of the claims of the
coal industry that it simply could not comply with some of the
interim regulations, bonding companies feared a dramatic increase in bond forfeitures in the state.
Some of these problems were litigated in the first set of court
challenges to the interim regulations. While most West Virginia
and industry challenges of the regulations were rejected by the
court, West Virginia submitted updated studies done by an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) consultant which persuaded
the court to require OSM to re-think its valley fill regulation. The
industry was able to convince the court to enjoin OSM sedimentation pond design criteria generally and to exempt certain preexisting structures from OSM's design criteria entirely.
The litigation taught West Virginia officials a valuable lesson.
It took more than a year's worth of discussions, attempted negotiations, and actual litigation to get OSM to recognize the value of
proven and environmentally acceptable state valley and hollow
fill design criteria-criteria which predated the federal law by
seven years. It wasn't until a federal consultant recommended
West Virginia's fills that OSM accepted them. Thus when OSM
developed what is called the "state window," a procedure through
which states could obtain variances from the federal regulations,
West Virginia was naturally skeptical about whether this procedure would solve its problems with the federal regulations. 2 The
"state window" enables the states to apply for and obtain a variance from the federal regulations if the state can demonstrate
that the proposed variance is consistent with federal law and regulations. The valley fill litigation taught West Virginia that "consistent with" meant "identical to." The "state window" thus appeared to be so narrow that state officials had no reason to believe
they would ever produce an alternative acceptable to OSM.
To an extent, the "state window" was a product of the first
year of OSM-DNR dialogue. Another product of the DNR-OSM
dialogue was what has become known as the Heine/Callaghan letter. OSM and West Virginia attempted to clarify certain aspects

2

44 Fed. Reg. 15,324 (1979); 30 C.F.R. § 731.13 (1979).
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of the interim regulations in a letter of understanding. The letter
was attacked from all sides once it was published. Other states,
industry and environmental groups threatened suit over such
things as clarification of ground water monitoring programs,
drainage control structures and designation of acceptable postmine land uses, all addressed in the letter.
After less than a year West Virginia's officials believed their
experience with attempts to apply the federal regulations on a
site-by-site basis demonstrated the inflexibility of those
regulations.
The experiences of federal administrative law judges reaffirmed what the states found. Section 525 of the federal act affords an operator the right to appeal notices of violation, cessation orders and civil penalty assessments to an administrative law
judge ("AL") and then to an appeals board. During these initial
hearings, the ALJ's applied the interim regulations to active mining operations. Their decisions in many instances caused an uproar within the OSM regional solicitors' offices. Some of the decisions offered strained interpretations of the federal regulations
simply because there was no practical way of applying the literal
regulatory language to problems encountered on a particular mine
site. ALJ's were called upon to determine such issues as when a
haulroad was deemed to be "constructed,"8 whether placement of
soil downslope of one bench but upslope from another was
"downslope placement," or whether perimeter markers had to be
clearly identified and whether they had to be visible from one to
another.5
Again the "unworkability" of the federal interim regulations
surfaced in such areas as topsoil stockpiling, valley fill construction, location of haulroads, water monitoring and pre-August 1977
structures. 6 Some ALJ decisions contain statements expressing
3Pegasus Mining Corp. v. OSM, (Docket No. CH 9-37-R) July 13, 1979.
4 Black Creek Coal Co. v. OSM, (Docket No. 8-3-P) Dec. 1, 1978 and Dec. 7,
1978 (footnote to decision).
5 Carbon Fuel Co. v. OSM, (Docket Nos. CH9-1-R, 9-2-R, 9-2-P, 9-3-P, and
9-6-P) Jan. 12, 1979.
' Island Creek Coal Co. v. OSM, (Docket No. CH 9-68-R) July 12, 1979; Eastover Mining Co. v. OSM, (Docket No. NX 9-47-R) July 16, 1979; and Big Valley
Coal Co. v. OSM, (Docket No. NX 9-33-R) Sept. 17, 1979.
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dissatisfaction with the interim regulations7 and frustration because the ALJ's could not change those regulations. 8
The coal industry was caught between federal and state agencies and angered by the overlap of the federal and state interim
regulations and policies. Even though the states were experiencing interpretive problems with the interim regulations, they were
required to apply them with or without federal guidance if they
wished to continue issuing mining permits. As a result many operators who had complied with state law in the past now challenged the states' position in many areas where only policy and
not written regulation controlled.
The number of appeals increased as did the number of notices of violation and when figures were released by OSM showing
that West Virginia led the nation in the number of federal inspections and violations, conditions worsened. These figures made little sense to West Virginia officials who believed their program to
be among the best in the nation. After an injunction against OSM
enforcement in Virginia had sent half of Virginia's federal inspection staff to West Virginia for six months, OSM inspectors began
issuing notices of violation in addition to similar state notices.
The operators did not know whose law controlled or how to comply, and neither did OSM or state inspectors.
DNR officials and many respectable operators were angered
by the massive OSM presence in West Virginia in comparison to
the size of OSM in neighboring states. At least one half of all the
Region I inspectors were writing violations in West Virginia. This
apparent inequity was also explained by the fact that OSM was
able to staff its Region I Charleston-based office before the other
four regions. This in itself caused another rift between OSM and
DNR because one-fourth of the latter's inspection staff joined
OSM.

7 Paramount Mining Corp. v. OSM, (Docket Nos. CH 8-7-R, CH 8-11-R) Dec.
1, 1978; Cedar Coal Co. v. OSM, (Docket No. CH 8-17-R) Nov. 17, 1978; Central
Utility Coal Co., Inc. v. OSM, (Docket No. IN 9-3-P) May 1, 1978; Fell Energy
Coal Corp. v. OSM, (Docket No. NX 9-99-R) Nov. 7, 1979.
8 Winston Ford Co., Inc. v. OSM, (Docket No. NX 9-51-R) June 28, 1979;
United Coal Corp. v. OSM, (Docket No. CH 9-10-R) Feb. 2, 1979; Rhonda Lou
Energy Corp. #2 v. OSM, (Docket No. CH 9-34-R) Nov. 8, 1979; and CarbonFuel,
supra, note 5.
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After one year of interim program experience the West Virginia Legislature passed legislation which will eliminate many
provisions of existing state law and state regulation which are
more stringent than applicable federal law or regulations. This
legislation was a response to the problems posed by the interim
program and the fear of a similar experience with the permanent
program. Unfortunately the DNR now faces an uphill battle to
convince the legislature that those provisions of state law which
are more stringent than federal law should be left intact. Legislatures in other states have placed similar limitations on their state
mining and reclamation laws being developed to comply with the
federal act. Because of OSM's goal to achieve nationwide uniformity, West Virginia may well lose its more stringent enforcement tools. For example, West Virginia inspectors have cessation
powers which are more stringent than the cessation powers in the
federal act and state inspections must occur every fifteen days,
while inspections under the federal act must occur every thirty
days.
The problems during the interim program multiplied when
OSM promulgated the permanent program regulations. The DNR
had submitted more than 350 pages of comments on the proposed
permanent regulations but state officials saw little evidence that
OSM paid attention to West Virginia's expertise. For a second
time state officials believed their expertise was ignored by OSM
in rulemaking proceedings.
It should be noted that West Virginia was not the only state
to be adversely affected by inflexible OSM regulations. In many
instances, the federal regulations would work in one region of the
country but not in another. They simply did not provide for state
alternatives which were calculated to achieve the same result as
their federal counterparts. This was a problem inherent in the interim regulations but the courts had approved the exclusive nature of many of the interim federal regulations and the permanent regulations would be similarly interpreted. Even though
state alternatives were documented by substantive evidence, as
long as the federal regulations were also premised upon a sound
basis, the federal regulations, though exclusive in nature, would
control.
In the late spring of 1979, the number of options available to
a state hoping to assume primacy over permit issuance was very
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limited. First, a state could adopt the permanent federal regulations verbatim and assure itself state program approval. The
problems inherent in this alternative were adequately demonstrated to West Virginia after it adopted the interim federal regulations, word for word in most instances, in August 1978.
Second, a state could choose not to submit a state program
and thereby pave the way for a federal program. A few states
have already chosen this option. However, since OSM has yet to
issue its first permit, it was feared that a federal program in West
Virginia would bring coal mining to a halt.
Third, a state could attempt to establish a better dialogue
with OSM. Once again prior experience indicated to West Virginia that this option was slow, uncertain and essentially unproductive because of OSM's perceived intransigence.
Finally, a state could seek legislation in Congress to achieve
in law what the states had as yet been unable to achieve in fact: a
true opportunity to develop, administer and enforce a program
suited to local needs. West Virginia officials maintained that section 101(f) and section 201(c)(9) of the federal act both supported
this option. The Congress, in section 101(f), found that:
Because of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing,
authorizing, issuing and enforcing regulations for surface mining
and reclamation operations subject to this Act should rest with
the States....
In section 201(c)(9) Congress required the Secretary of Interior to:
Assist the States in the development of State programs for
surface coal mining and reclamation operations which meet the
requirements of the Act, and at the same time, reflect local reand local environmental and agricultural
quirements
conditions....

West Virginia asked how OSM could justify its actions and,
more importantly, its regulations, in view of these explicit provisions. OSM responded by relying upon the congressional purpose
announced in section 102 of the Act. It has always been OSM's
position that the Act's goal of establishing a nationwide program
to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of
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coal mining would be thwarted by twenty-six or so different sets
of state regulations.
By early June 1979, OSM still held the upper hand and
would not budge. The Secretary of Interior ultimately had the
final say on state program approvals and the date for implementation of a federal program remained unchanged. At this stage in
the implementation of the federal act, West Virginia officials felt
their best hope was to turn to Congress. The maintained that if
the state's problems with the federal regulations were indeed real,
Congress would pass the Rockefeller Amendment or some variation of it. Thus the Amendment was drafted and sent to
Washington.
I.

THE

EFFECTS OF THE ROCKEFELLER AMENDMENT

The Amendment survived a ten to eight vote in the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, but passed by an
overwhelming margin in the full Senate. The CongressionalRecord is replete with statements from senators criticizing OSM's attitude, the federal regulations, and, most of all, the way in which
OSM exceeded the intent of the Congress.9 In speech after
speech, senators reaffirmed their intention of a state-lead concept
behind P.L. 95-87. The opposition could come up with little substantive evidence to stem the tide in the Senate. An agreement
had been reached by certain senators that they would only amend
P.L. 95-87 to change state program submission dates and that no
other amendments would be considered. The agreement was
breached when section 3 was added to S. 1403. Throughout the
Senate debates on S. 1403, the opponents relied upon that prior
agreement and advocated defeat of section 3.
Opponents also objected to the Rockefeller Amendment because the flexibility of the federal regulations had not been
tested. Some opposed it for other reasons which have resurfaced
in the House. After receiving a petition signed by twenty-five of
the forty-three members from his committee urging consideration
of S. 1403, Representative Udall outlined the major reasons why
S. 1403 should be defeated. In a letter dated October 9, 1979,
Udall stated that S. 1403 was no longer necessary because its pur9 125 CONG. REc. S. 12,350-389 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
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pose could be accomplished through the "state window" in the
permanent federal regulations. Second, S. 1403 would enable
states to develop weaker regulations. Second, S. 1403 would evoke
an administrative and judicial nightmare. Finally, S. 1403 would
not help restore vitality to the coal industry.
For twenty-six senators Representative Udall's arguments
had been highly persuasive. He was right in that some states will
use S. 1403 to dilute the permanent federal regulations. There is
no uniform enforcement or application of the interim regulations.
S. 1403 could also shatter any hopes for total national uniformity
that OSM may have for the permanent program. Udall was also
right in that S. 1403 could obviously lead to litigation and could
ultimately delay state program approval. However, state officials
wondered whether these were valid reasons to defeat S. 1403.
S. 1403 is a state-sponsored and state-supported amendment.
The states say that it does not change any of the Act's more than
115 performance standards and more importantly, S. 1403 does
not dilute the power of the Secretary of the Interior to disapprove
state programs. In fact, if anything, S. 1403 enhances that power.
The Secretary could literally require state laws which were carbon
copies of the federal law, disapprove any regulations that appeared to weaken the federal act and reject the state program.
Invariably state programs also will omit segments of the federal
regulations and any time this occurs the Secretary has cause to
believe that the state program does not comply with the federal
act. This could lead to delay in state program approvals. But the
states ask whether each state has the right to make that decision
for itself and risk implementation of a federal program.
According to section 504 of the federal act, if the state program is submitted by November 3, 1980, but disapproved, then
the state only has sixty days in which to make the changes necessary to obtain approval. Once a state program is rejected after
that sixty-day amendment period, a federal program must be implemented in that state by OSM. Thus the Act has a built-in incentive to entice the states into copying the federal regulations as
often as possible and there are other safeguards built into the federal act which are left unchanged by S. 1403. The Act provides for
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citizen complaints,1" citizen inspections," citizen suits,1 2 continual
federal supervision, 2 and provisions whereby OSM can withdraw
state program approval when the state fails to regulate adequately coal mining. 4 These safeguards, plus S. 1403's requirement that state law and state regulations remain consistent with
the federal act, should allay the concerns of those who fear S.
1403 will "gut" the federal act. Collectively and individually, criticisms of S. 1403 failed to sway a majority in the Senate.
Even under S. 1403 those states which enact weak regulations
risk having their programs disapproved by the Secretary. Since
litigation challenging state program disapproval does not prevent
implementation of a federal program, the Secretary remains in a
position to ensure national uniformity and avoid the competitive
advantage of inadequate state regulation simply by disapproving
state program submissions and implementing federal programs.
Passage of S. 1403 could cause an administrative or judicial
nightmare, but many are convinced the "state window" process
will also create such a nightmare. Either with or without S. 1403,
states hoping to assure primacy quickly should make variances
from the federal regulations the exception rather than the rule to
ensure program approval. But variances under S. 1403 theoretically should be easier to obtain because the state is not required
to justify each word in state regulations which differs from each
word in the federal regulations. Of course, state regulations must
still satisfy the requirements of the federal act.
S. 1403 will not increase coal production. It has been adequately demonstrated, however, that environmental regulations
did not put the industry where it is today; rather, events in recent
years have made an unstable market. Coal-importing countries
have turned to other more stable sources of supply. Coal production has actually increased since the passage of the federal act,
but there are still no markets and coal stockpiling continues. Coal
conversion of utilities is still on the horizon. Moreover, concern
about the pollution associated with the preparation and burning
10

12
13
24

Pub. L. No. 95-87 §§ 521(a)(1), 517(h)(1).
Id. at § 521(a)(1).

Id. at § 520.
Id. at § 504(a).
Id. at § 504(b).
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of coal has reached international proportions. Acid rain has become a household word. The country is being educated about the
thousands of lakes made sterile by rain with a ph of less than five.
In the West, railroad shipping rates have recently skyrocketed.
Given this background, S. 1403 supporters hoped it could lighten
the burden imposed by the federal regulations to the extent that
state regulations would be more attuned to local needs. Although
localized state regulations may not always reduce the cost of compliance, the costs associated with the federal regulations are, according to the industry and the Carter administration, unduly
excessive.
IV.

EVENTS SINCE THE AMENDMENT WAS WRITTEN

The problems outlined above could have been resolved by
now had OSM and the states been able to work together. Unfortunately, they did not really begin to cooperate until September
1979. There has now been a shift in OSM's attitude. Key staff
members were replaced by persons more receptive to the concept
of working with the states. OSM began to realize that many of
the states' concerns are or were real. OSM staffers began to work
with state technical staffs to resolve problems and develop workable alternatives. Most recently a second letter of understanding
between OSM and DNR was released. That letter addresses major problems with the federal regulations such as bonding, sediment control and methods of mining. Although some of these
problems affect the coal states differently because of terrain or
climate, they are of national importance. The sincere attempts to
resolve these problems on OSM's part has encouraged many.
There are, however, signs of concern by others that the new
cooperative attitude of OSM is only a temporary reaction to the
Rockefeller Amendment. They fear it will disappear as quickly as
it surfaced if S. 1403 is defeated. West Virginia officials do not
share these concerns. They believe the states have been vindicated. They believe that the new OSM policy lends credence to
the complaints which prompted S. 1403 and that the proposals to
initiate rulemaking proceedings demonstrate that many federal
regulations are not responsive to local conditions.
The threat to OSM embodied in S. 1403 is still very much
alive as is OSM's most recent attempt to work with the states.
The Rockefeller Amendment crystalized the states' frustration
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and anger over "unworkable" regulations. OSM had not adequately cured the primary cause of that frustration and anger in a
manner which was satisfactory to the states. OSM had not, during its first two years, responded well to the site-specific nature of
coal mining.
CONCLUSION

Had the federal act been passed in the early 1970's, OSM's
regulations may have fared better. Perhaps then the "state window" concept would have been accepted in spite of OSM's attitude. During that period this country's environmental conscience
was awakened with the passage of the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts, though neither of those Acts were as specific or as exacting
as the 1977 Surface Mining Act. Now however, the tables have
turned. The President's proposed Energy Mobilization Board bill
epitomizes the rising fear of over-regulation. S. 1403 may well be
a by-product of "over-regulation."
S. 1403 may set the tone for the 1980's. The federal and state
governments must work together in the future if we are to resolve
our environmental problems. Both sides must begin to appreciate
the value of cooperation. Unfortunately, given the deadlines set
by the Act, without S. 1403 no major eastern coal-producing state
may receive state program approval before 1981.
S. 1403 gives the states a quicker, more acceptable opportunity to assume primacy with regulations tailored to local conditions. It also increases the risk of federal takeover if S. 1403 is
abused. S. 1403 changes the federal regulations from mandatory
to optional guidelines but those regulations remain binding on
federal lands and on lands in those states which fail timely to
obtain state program approval. Since those regulations also represent OSM's interpretation of the federal act, they will be highly persuasive indicia of the Act's requirements and would be so
applied by the federal district court judges who will preside over
litigation challenging the Secretary's disapproval of state programs (with S. 1403) or rejection of "state window" alternatives
(without S.1403).
There should be much give and take on both sides and certain compromises must be made concerning language of the
states' regulations. Cooperation in the field between state and
federal inspectors and operators must continue to improve. Fi-
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nally, it is hoped that the operators will begin to understand what
the federal act requires of them in each region of the country regardless of the fate of the Rockefeller Amendment.
S. 1403 presents the Congress with an early opportunity to
weigh inflation, energy needs and protection of the environment.
Today Americans are continually reminded of over-regulation and
federal presence. Some nationwide polls show that a majority of
Americans believe environmentalists are out of touch with reality.
Yet, since those same polls also demonstrate that the majority of
Americans want to protect the environment and prevent further
environmental degradation, environmentalists cannot be too out
of touch. No one will dispute the fact that coal mining does harm
our environment. There is, however, disagreement on the degree
of harm coal mining causes. Furthermore, while most agree that
coal is needed to meet our energy needs, many fear the environmental costs are too high. S. 1403 may precipitate a confrontation
among these conflicting concerns if it is put before the full House.
S. 1403 may also foreshadow what role, if any, the states will play
in development of national energy and environmental policies.
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